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Abstract 
This paper uses micro data from the 1998-99 Indian Time Use Survey (ITUS - covering 
77,593 persons in 18,591 households in Gujarat, Tamil Nadu, Madhya Pradesh, Meghalaya, 
Orissa and Haryana) to examine the relative quantitative importance of social capital and of 
inequality in land ownership and caste status in determining whether a household will have to 
collect water. The paper argues that time use data provides a natural metric for measuring ‘social 
capital’ building activities, and for distinguishing between ‘bonding’ into groups or ‘bridging’ 
within communities. In India, the probability that a rural household fetches water decreases by 
15.7% and 7.4% respectively when the average time spent on social interaction and community-
based activities at the district level doubles, but it increases by 19.2% when the time in group-
based activities doubles. Inequalities in income, land ownership and home ownership are 
associated with considerably larger differences in local tap water availability. 
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Social Capital and Basic Goods:  
The Cautionary Tale of Drinking Water in India 
  Human survival requires water to drink, and for sanitation and food preparation. The 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR 1992)
1 has suggested that 15 litres 
per person per day is the minimum total necessary while the Human Development Report (HDR 
2006) of United Nations Development Program (UNDP) sets a daily minimum of 20 litres per 
capita. Whatever the exact level of this basic need, the residents of developed countries (and the 
majority of Indian citizens) can simply turn the tap
2 and satisfy it immediately. However, in 16% 
of rural and 9.6% of urban Indian households in 1999 (containing approximately 140 million 
people
3), somebody (usually female) had to spend approximately ¾ of an hour each day fetching 
it. 
Why do they now not have the access that most people in India take for granted? This 
paper begins in Section 1 with an overview of water collection in India and a brief description of 
our data source: the Indian Time Use Survey of 1998-99. Section 2 develops a simple model of 
water provision whose main feature is inequality in net individual benefits from collective water 
supply and the potential role played by social capital in helping solve the problem of organizing 
collective action. Section 3 then suggests that a natural metric for local social capital building 
activities might be the average amount of time that local residents spend in social interaction, 
group or community activities, and examines the relative importance for the supply of water of 
community and group level social capital and of inequality in land and in caste. Section 4 
concludes. 
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1.   Overview 
1.1  Basic Needs and the Time Burden of Carrying Water 
  Although the Human Poverty Index of the UNDP includes, as one of its components, the 
percentage of the population
4 “without sustainable access to an improved water source”, it goes on 
to define “reasonable access” as “the availability of at least 20 litres a person per day from a source 
within 1 kilometre of the user’s dwelling”. As any reader can easily check, carrying this amount of 
water for a four person family (i.e. 80 litres per day) is hard work
5 – and a return journey of up to 
two kilometres takes significant time. If there is no community provision, the affluent can often 
afford to dig their own private wells, so it is the poor – i.e. poor women (this is a highly gendered 
task) – who may have to spend a significant part of every day carrying water. The construction and 
maintenance of public water distribution infrastructure requires community organization and the 
literature on social capital stresses the facilitating role of social interaction and group membership 
for that community organization – but the fact that the affluent do not have to carry water is likely 
to be crucially important in determining their support. Analysis of the time people spend carrying 
water therefore raises, in a very concrete way, some central concerns about inequality, gender, 
public goods provision and social capital in the development process. 
1.2   Data Description 
Between June, 1998 and July, 1999, the Central Statistical Organization of India 
conducted a pilot Time Use Survey (the ITUS). As Pandey (1999) describes, a stratified random 
sampling design, as followed in the National Sample Surveys (NSS), was used to select 1066 
rural and 488 urban strata of small, medium and large rural villages and urban towns within 52 
(out of 147) separate districts in 6 states. In each First Stage Unit, 12 randomly selected 
households were interviewed, producing a sample of 18,591 households (12,750 rural and 5,841   5
urban) with 77,593 persons (53,981 rural and 23,612 urban). The survey was conducted in four 
rounds during the year to capture seasonal variations in the time use patterns of the population. 
Two person teams of male and female interviewers stayed in each village or urban block for nine 
days to compile time diaries for normal, abnormal and weekly variant days. Respondent 
households were first visited to assess their weekly pattern of time use and then revisited to 
complete a full diary of activities concerning the previous day for all household members aged 
six years or older. Although the sample design was explicitly constructed to capture differences 
in time use between normal and weekly variant or abnormal
6 days, in practice Hirway (2000, 24) 
noted that “On an average, of the total 7 days, 6.51 were normal, 0.44 weekly variant day and 
0.05 was abnormal day… in rural areas people continue their normal activities on holidays also.” 
This paper therefore focuses on time use on “normal” days. 
   As Pandey (1999, 1) noted: “India has lot of socio-economic, demographic, geographic 
and cultural diversities. To ensure that all aspects of diversities are captured, Haryana, Madhya 
Pradesh, Gujarat, Orissa, Tamil Nadu and Meghalaya were chosen to represent northern, central, 
western, eastern, southern and north-eastern regions respectively.” Although one might wonder 
whether six states’ data could fully capture the diversity of India, Hirway (2000, 11) has argued 
“cross-checking of the results has confirmed that the sample is fairly representative of the 
country.” In any event, this data would be interesting even if this were not the case, i.e. even if 
the data were only seen as a sample of the approximately 233 million people inhabiting these 
states.  
Paid collection of water is a very minor phenomenon in both rural and urban areas. In 
rural areas only 1.2% of water collection time was paid, and in urban areas only about 1.4%. Just 
0.13% (0.17%) of rural (urban) households that collect water do so only for payment.
7 In the   6
analysis below, we therefore ignore the issue of paid water collection. Figure 1 plots the 
distribution of total water collection time in the households which have to collect water in rural 
and urban areas – throughout this paper we examine rural and urban areas separately. We can see 
that both in rural and urban areas, there is a wide variation in the times that households spend on 
collecting water. 
Table 1 presents some basic descriptive statistics on who collects water in rural and urban 
areas. Columns R1-R3 and U1-U3 for rural and urban areas, respectively, focus on individuals 
living in households where someone fetches water. R1 and U1 show the total time spent on 
fetching water by individuals belonging to a particular category (e.g. boys) as a percentage of the 
total time spent on fetching water by all individuals. For example, in rural areas 1.3% of all water 
fetching work is done by boys and another 7.0% is done by adult men, while in urban areas boys 
do 0.4% of this work and men do about 10.9%. Columns R2 and U2 give the relative probability 
that if a household has to collect water, a particular type of person will do it. Given that an 
individual belongs to a certain category (e.g. a boy), we compute the probability that he/she 
collects water. We then normalize this by dividing it with the probability that any individual 
collects water – hence the interpretation of relative probability or a ratio of probabilities. Clearly, 
“carrying water” is a heavily gendered task – Columns R1 and U1 indicate that in both the rural 
and urban areas of India, adult women do about 87% of this kind of work, while Columns R2 
and U2 show that, in households which have to fetch water, the frequency of water collection by 
adult women is twice as high as the average probability of collecting water.
8 
Columns R3 and U3 report the average time spent in a normal day by people who have to 
collect water. For those people who have to do it, carrying water is clearly a significant task. As 
column R3 shows, gender inequity is greater among adults than among children – on average   7
rural women who fetch water spend more time (47 minutes daily) than rural men (40 minutes), 
but boys (48 minutes) and girls (50 minutes) have a more similar average task. In the sample, in 
urban areas, 11.5% of households collect water, compared to 18.6% of  rural households 
(translating to 16% (9.6%) of rural (urban) Indian households), but for those households which 
do have to collect water, Table 1 indicates that there are relatively small urban/rural differences 
in the distribution and difficulty of this task (except for girls). 
Table 1 also indicates that intra-household gender differences in the burden of water 
collection are much larger than between-household differences associated with other 
characteristics – like caste status, land or homestead ownership, occupation or gender of 
household head. With the exception of Scheduled Tribes
9 status, the relative probabilities of 
water collection (R2 and U2) and average daily time (R3 and U3) diverge somewhat, in the 
expected directions, but gender differences are clearly largest in magnitude. 
2. A Simple Model of the Supply of Tap Water 
Wherever they live, humans must have some source of water – what determines whether 
the infrastructure to deliver water is constructed or whether households have to carry water from 
whatever source exists? Water is not a classic “public good” since it is both rival in consumption 
and excludable in access. But because wells, reservoirs, piping and other water production 
facilities have significant indivisibilities and economies of scale
10 and since efficient distribution 
of water often requires piping or aqueducts which might cross many individuals’ properties, in 
most countries the public sector is deeply involved in provision of water infrastructure
 11. 
In affluent nations, tap water supply is nearly universal, but, as mentioned above, in 
developing countries like India a significant proportion of households do not have access to tap 
water supply.  Piped water delivery requires the construction of distribution facilities that in   8
India are often far beyond the means of individual households. In addition to the fixed cost of 
pumping stations and the marginal costs of piping and maintenance, there is a cost to the 
negotiations required to arrange construction and the rights of way needed for water distribution 
– negotiations which are more difficult because the benefits of piped water are unequally 
distributed. 
  For a simple model to capture the inequality of net benefits in water distribution, we start 
by abstracting from the specificities of geography and assuming that a point source of water – 
e.g. a well with finite capacity – now serves a population that is uniformly distributed on a 
featureless plain. Suppose that this well can supply N households spread uniformly over a radius 
D from the well head. Since each individual household is located at a given distance from the 
well, line OC in Figure 2 plots the cost in time and effort of collecting water from the well for 
household i with opportunity cost of time wi  as a fixed time cost of filling containers (wi c) and a 
linear function of distance (wi di). We assume that the technology of tap water supply is 
characterized by the fixed cost of digging a well and maintaining a pumping station, whose 
annualized value is given by b0, and a constant marginal cost per meter of connective piping and 
maintenance (annualized to b1). Conditional on individuals closer to the well already being 
connected to the distribution system, line MC in Figure 2 plots the marginal cost function (b1). 
The piped water system would pass an aggregate cost-benefit test if the aggregate gains 
from time savings cover the fixed and variable costs – i.e. if Net Social Benefits are positive 
[NSB>0]. 
NSB = Σi (wi c + wi di) – (b0 + b1D)       [ 1 ]  
The average total technical cost (ATTC) of water supply per household is given by: 
ATTC  = (b0 + b1D ) / N         [2]   9
The point of Figure 2 is to illustrate a dilemma in piped water systems. The benefit to an 
individual household of the piped water system is the value of time saved (wi c+wi di), which 
varies with distance from the wellhead (di) and opportunity cost of time (wi). Households located 
close to a point source of water have the least to gain from piped water supply, because their 
current time costs of carrying water are smaller – indeed Figure 2 is meant to illustrate the 
(extreme) case where those closest to the water source are unwilling to pay even the marginal 
cost of connection. However, more distant households can only connect at the marginal cost of 
service (b1) if the pipe system already serves those of their neighbours who are nearer the source. 
  The household’s opportunity cost of time (wi) depends upon their human capital stock. 
There is also a pure wealth effect (e.g. from land ownership) on wi, via the income elasticity of 
demand for leisure, conditional on human capital. For an individual household, the cost of 
digging a private well sufficient for the household’s own use is plausibly less than the fixed cost 
of a well and pumping station big enough for the local district, but even if it is not, for 
sufficiently large values of wi, one will observe (wi c+wi di) > b0 . Although collective provision 
at an average total cost of (b0 + b1D)/N would usually be cheaper than self provision, if collective 
provision cannot be arranged, the affluent will find it worthwhile to dig their own private wells. 
     A pure market based system of water supply could involve a very complicated game of 
bluff, hold-up and reneging on contracts
12. Since no agent would otherwise make irrevocable 
fixed cost investments in facilities and piping, some credible institutions for the enforcement of 
long term contracts would be needed. Substantial transactions costs in bilateral monopoly/ 
monopsony bargaining would also be incurred if each household were to buy from their 
upstream neighbour and then try to exploit their market power over downstream neighbours. The 
non-existence of long term contract enforcement institutions is arguably a crucial part of the   10
development problem – but even in highly developed market systems, the provision of water to 
households is usually done by public utilities, or under strict public regulation.  
Organizing collective action faces, however, the problem that inequality in the net 
benefits of a piped water system is inherent, since the opportunity cost of not having a water 
distribution system depends on the distance water must otherwise be carried and is accentuated 
by any inequality in the opportunity cost of time w – which will vary with household wealth, in 
both human capital and land ownership. As well, if water carrying is a gendered task and if the 
benefits of piped water in saved labour are received by women while the cash costs of municipal 
water rates are paid partly by men, inequality in power within households will affect the 
perceived net benefits of the family patriarch, who may be the relevant “voter”. 
Even if all individuals realize that there are economies of scale in water supply that imply 
a net surplus is created by joint action, will households co-operate in the collective provision of 
water? Institutions (like water supply authorities) do not drop without cost from the sky. A costly 
process of negotiation is necessary, which is larger if interests diverge and tends to be more 
protracted if mutual trust is absent. We presume that the total cost of negotiation depends 
multiplicatively on both the total absolute difference between residents in the net benefits they 
will receive from the water system [    j i j i u u − Σ Σ ] and the level of mutual mistrust.  
If we summarize “mistrust” as a parameter b2, Equation 3 expresses the total cost of 
water supply (TC) as the sum of the technical and negotiation costs – i.e. fixed costs (b0) and 
variable costs of connection (b1D) plus negotiation costs. 
[3]                           2 1 0 j i j i u u b D b b TC − Σ Σ + + =  
Average costs of piped water supply (ATC) are then given by Equation 4
13. If the crucial 
issue for political support of a water authority is whether or not the critical voter is better off (i.e.   11
whether ATC < OC), this implies that the important variables are the fixed cost of supply and the 
degree of inequality in the benefits of piped water and of mistrust. 
[4]               / / ) ( 2 1 0 N u u b N D b b ATC j i j i − Σ Σ + + =  
3. Why do some households have to collect water? 
The question “Why do some households in India have to collect water?” has two 
components:  
1] Why do some localities have tap water while others do not?  
2] Why, when local facilities exist, do some households not benefit, because they are not 
connected to the local water distribution system?  
In our data, we observe the likelihood that a particular household will have to spend time 
fetching water – a compound probability equal to one minus the product of the probability [P1] 
that tap water is available from a local well or pipe system and the conditional probability [P2] 
that the household can connect to the local distribution system, if it exists. We want to examine 
the characteristics of communities that determine the local availability of drinking water and the 
characteristics of households that determine access to locally available supplies. We expect the 
probability of tap water availability to depend negatively on average total cost, so that (writing σ 
for a measure of inequality in the opportunity cost of time wi) one would expect: 
P1 = f1(b0 , b1D, b2 ,σ)       [5] 
Isham and Kähkönen (2002) have also emphasized the benefits of village level social 
capital for the effective design, implementation and maintenance of rural water projects in rural 
India and Sri Lanka. The impacts of greater mistrust (b2) on costs of water provision may 
therefore enter via multiple paths - in higher initial negotiation costs and in increasing the fixed 
and variable technical costs of water supply (b0 and b1) (also see Isham and Kähkönen (1999) on   12
water in Java). In equation [5], the technical costs of water provision (summarized in b0, b1D) 
and the levels of mistrust (b2) and inequality (σ) are characteristics of the community. Whether 
an individual household can connect to an available local network depends on their household 
disposable income (yi), and on whether they are a member of a socially excluded group (Si), 
which implies the conditional probability of tap water access as in [6] and the compound 
probability of fetching water as in [7]. 
P2 = f2(yi, Si)       [6] 
[1 - P1 P2  ]= f3(b0 , b1D, b2 ,σ, yi, Si )     [7] 
3.1  Social Capital, Other Community Characteristics and Access to Water 
In recent years, a vast (and much contested) literature
14 has stressed the importance of 
local “social capital” for the organization of co-operative action – either in direct voluntary 
supply of local infrastructure or in the mobilization of political pressure which produces 
government action. The World Bank’s website on Social Capital states: 
 “Social Capital refers to the norms and networks that enable collective action. It encompasses institutions, 
relationships, and customs that shape the quality and quantity of a society's social interactions. Increasing evidence 
shows that social capital is critical for societies to prosper economically and for development to be sustainable. 
Social capital, when enhanced in a positive manner, can improve project effectiveness and sustainability by building 
the community’s capacity to work together to address their common needs, fostering greater inclusion and cohesion, 
and increasing transparency and accountability
15.” 
Putnam has variously defined “social capital” as “connections among individuals – social 
networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them” (2000, 19) or as 
“features of social organization, such as networks, norms, and trust that facilitate co-ordination 
and co-operation for mutual benefit” (Putnam, 1993). For Woolcock and Narayan (2000, 227) 
“social capital refers to the norms and networks that enable people to act collectively”.   13
Phrased in this way, “social capital” sounds inherently positive, but many authors have 
noted that norms and networks are specific to particular cultures and historical periods, implying 
that “social capital” and associational life can be either positive or negative in its implications for 
development. Norms and networks can “bond” individuals into mutually exclusionary, divisive, 
small social groups or “bridge” social groups and thereby link individuals within the wider 
society. Ethnic and religious tensions which undermine development may be partly the product 
of strong within group bonding, as well as dysfunctionally high inter-group mistrust – the 
“collective action” of social groups in that context can either accentuate or reduce communal 
mistrust. Although Mogues and Carter (2005) are representative of a large literature which sees 
local social capital as determining the co-operative behaviour on which development depends, 
there is also a sceptical literature which notes that “not all local organizations are created equal. 
Depending on who is doing the organizing, and why, increased participation in local 
organizations can either be exclusionary and reinforce existing decision making powers and 
structures …. or can widen the base of voice, information, and participation” (Alatas, Pritchett, 
and Wetterberg, 2003, 38. See also Harriss (2002), Mansuri and Rao (2004) and Hammer and 
Pritchett (2006)) 
How should one measure “social capital” and test its implications for development? In 
particular, how might one distinguish between “bridging” and “bonding” social capital and test 
whether the positive impacts of “bridging” activities are outweighed by the negative influences 
of “bonding” into divisive sub-groups? 
One strand of the literature has relied on summary questions which ask respondents to 
indicate their level of trust in others. For example, Knack and Keefer’s much cited 1997 results 
reporting the positive impacts of social capital on economic growth relied on the World Values   14
Survey question: “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that 
you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?” As they noted, responses to such general 
questions mingle how much trust one places in people who are not close friends or relatives, and 
the frequency of encounters with such persons, which makes it impossible to distinguish bridging 
and bonding effects. 
A second tradition in the literature measures the prevalence of local networks by 
querying individuals about their associational memberships and their participation in local 
community and political activities. Narayan and Pritchett (1999a, 1999b), for example, argued 
that Tanzanian villages in which individuals belonged to more groups were also richer (and that 
the relationship was causal)
16. However, if “Associational life” is measured by membership 
counts (by, for example, asking respondents: “Are you, or is someone in your household, a 
member of any groups, organizations or associations
17?”), it is not obvious how to aggregate 
memberships. The raw number of associational memberships is an index which weights equally 
intensive and marginal involvements of individuals, and which does not differentiate the 
purposes and types of associations – but index numbers with arbitrary aggregation properties
18 
may produce econometrically fragile results.  
 As well, both “trust” and associational membership may be important inputs into “norms 
and networks”, but neither is a direct measurement of them.
19 ‘Trust’ (like “politeness”) is an 
aspect of interpersonal attitudes and relationships. Associational memberships are a proxy for a 
person’s number of social contacts. Both may facilitate co-operation in networks, and may 
possibly help to sustain norms of behaviour, but neither directly measure “norms and networks”.  
In this paper, we suggest that time might be, in many ways, a natural metric for social 
capital building activities, because social interaction necessarily takes time – and should show up   15
in time use diaries. The minutes which people spend in group or community activities are a 
natural unit for aggregation and the total time spent on an activity is an inter-personally 
comparable indicator of intensity of involvement – unlike subjective grading by respondents of 
intensity of trust or of participation in associations. Additionally, because the time diary method 
of data collection walks respondents through a specific day’s activities from morning to evening, 
it provides both a narrative spur to more complete respondent recall of particular events and a 
consistency check on total reported activities, due to the time diary constraint that the aggregate 
length of all of a day’s activities must sum to 24 hours.  (In contrast, no aggregate consistency 
check on total memberships or ‘trust’ is possible.) Time diaries therefore have the potential to 
provide a measure of ‘associational life’ with important advantages – recognizing that social 
interaction time is, like associational membership or trust, an input into social capital (conceived 
of as ‘norms and networks’) and not a direct measurement of it.  
The designers of the ITUS were clearly aware of the “Social Capital” literature - both 
formal political and “civil society” types of interaction and informal socialization were 
separately identified and coded, and the ITUS also distinguished between informal social 
interaction (such as Talking, Gossiping and Quarreling - 951) and formalized associational 
interactions. Furthermore, under the general heading of activities identified as Community 
Services and Help To Other Households: the ITUS specifically distinguished between 
community based activities
20 and group activities
21. The  community based activities are 
specifically defined to correspond to the sort of “bridging” associations that bring benefits to the 
entire community, but it is an open question whether such usages of time as “participation in 
meetings of local and informal groups/caste, tribes, professional associations, union, fraternal   16
and political organisations (651)” are bonding individuals into narrow sub-groups, based partly 
on pre-existing divisions (such as caste) or linking individuals across narrow interest groups. 
   As Putnam (2000) argues, personal connections and networks of trust are the basis of 
political organizing and civil society. The informal social interactions on which such networks 
depend occur both at social events and in casual encounters. The ITUS data reports the time 
individuals spend in “Social and Cultural Activities, Mass Media, etc.”  As Table 2 indicates, 
casual encounters and “Talking, gossiping, quarrelling” are common – in rural (urban) areas, 
44.56% (28.72%) of adult
22 men and 29.39% (28.59%) of adult women report doing some of 
this, for an average of 33.75 (20.46) minutes for men and 19.85 (18.22) minutes for women. 
(Note that the impossibility of distinguishing between informal “talking”, “gossiping” or 
“quarrelling” as different activities and the ambiguity associated with whether one would expect 
them to have a positive or negative impact for development illustrates somewhat concretely the 
broader ambiguity in the implications of social capital for development.) However, many 
important time uses are not of daily frequency, for any specific individual. Social events
23 are, 
for example, somewhat episodic – on any given randomly selected normal day one only observes 
about one male in twenty engaged in a recorded social event, with an average duration of about 
one hour and twenty minutes
24. 
Our hypothesis is that time use data can be used as an index of the social interaction that 
produces social capital and reduces mistrust (b2). However, aggregating the average amount of 
time spent in each local area on all types of social interaction – community work, group 
activities, social activities and casual conversation – into a single total amount of local social 
interaction would presume that all types of social interaction have a common influence on   17
mistrust (b2) and hence the same impact on the provision of local public services – an assumption 
which Alatas, Pritchett, and Wetterberg (2003) question, and one we can test explicitly. 
  Within each district, the average time spent in social activities by all men and women can 
be thought of as a local community characteristic which is plausibly exogenous to the intra-
household time allocation decisions of any specific individual family, and whether or not specific 
households have to carry water. Moreover, because water carrying is largely ‘women’s work’, 
the average socialization time of males in a district is unlikely to be affected by the non-
availability of tap water to some of the district’s households – especially given the many other 
margins of possible time adjustments available. Since we can measure separately the average 
social time of men and of women in each district, we can check whether there is any difference 
in empirical results when we examine the impacts of male social time, female social time or both 
aggregated. Table 3 reports results using just average male social time, but estimation results 
using only female social time, or male and female time, are essentially similar
25. 
  According to the seventh schedule of the Indian constitution,
26 water and sanitation are 
under the purview of the state governments (and not the federal/central government). The 73
rd 
and 74
th amendments to the Indian constitution (adopted in 1993) mandated state governments to 
devolve power to local rural (i.e. Panchayats) and urban bodies, respectively. However, since 
local government (including reform at the local level) comes under the State List, the onus of 
implementing these amendments fell on the state governments. As a result, implementation has 
been far from successful, and this would be particularly true in 1998-99, when the ITUS was 
conducted. According to Chaudhuri (2006), none of the states in the ITUS sample have 
undertaken significant devolution. Hence, since state governments work through districts, which 
both function as administrative units
27 and can make demands on the state, we treat the district as   18
the locus within which social capital will have its impact (or not). We also therefore focus on 
inequality at the district level (in land and expenditure) - decomposing it into between village 
and within village components and separately assessing their impacts. Our results are essentially 
similar even if we use the village/urban block instead of the district.
28 
Table 3 reports probit regression results estimating Equation [7] above for rural and 
urban households (i.e. we estimate the probability that member(s) of a given household will 
spend some time, in a normal day, collecting water). Table A1 in the appendix presents 
descriptive statistics for the variables used in these regressions. Because diary data generally 
does not observe “lumpy” types of events every day, episodic usages of time have to be thought 
of in terms of the conditional expectation of a particular time use, on a randomly selected normal 
day. This means that low frequency events (like participation in community functions) may be 
susceptible to variability in small samples, which implies that the bootstrapping procedure 
described in Efron and Tibshirani (1993), Mooney and Duval (1993) and Davison and Hinkley 
(1997) is particularly appropriate for our purposes. To ensure that our results not be sensitive to 
sampling error, Table 3 reports marginal effects and p values based on estimated coefficients and 
standard errors from 1,000 replications
29 for a base household (non-scheduled caste, non-
scheduled tribe, male headed, with average monthly per-capita expenditure and dependency 
ratio. This household lives in a district with average values for all the district-level variables - 
inequality, scheduled caste proportion, scheduled tribe proportion etc.). In rural areas, the base 
case is landless, laborer and homestead owning, whereas in urban areas it is not homestead 
owning and neither laborer nor professional
30. 
Table 3 includes Model A in the first column to show the results we would obtain if we 
did not consider any social capital variables. Model B adds time spent in social interactions, but   19
reports the results obtained when time spent by men in all types of community and group 
activities
31 are added together and averaged. However, our preferred specification is Model C, in 
which time spent in community and group activities are separately identified and averaged. 
We present all these specifications because we want to examine the robustness of our 
results. Qualitatively, there are only a few differences in sign or statistical significance to note. 
Looking first at individual characteristics, the tendency of economists is to think of price and 
income effects as possible explanatory variables in predicting household demand for a service 
(such as tap water) – but the size of such effects, relative to the influence of other possible 
explanatory variables, is an empirical issue. The ITUS data does not contain any direct 
measurement of the money price of water but hook-up charges or local taxes to defray 
distribution costs may still imply that “ability to pay” could be a significant barrier to having tap 
water, even where it is locally available. 
In both urban and rural areas, the household’s monthly per capita expenditure is highly 
statistically significant
32 and negatively associated with having to fetch water, with a similar size 
coefficient in urban and rural areas.
33 Moreover, one could arguably expect wealth and not 
income to be the more important individual household determinant of access to tap water. The 
negative coefficient on “professional” household status, predicting the probability of fetching 
water, may reflect human capital wealth, and the positive association with greater number of 
dependents is also consistent with this interpretation. However, in rural areas, the statistical 
insignificance of landlessness, home ownership and a dummy variable “laborer” (indicating that 
more than 50% of income is from agricultural or other labour status) can be read as indicating 
that these variables have little additional explanatory power in rural areas that is not already 
captured in monthly expenditure. These results contrast with the urban evidence of positive 
Deleted: consistently and 
Deleted: ly
Deleted: significant   20
correlation of laborer status and water carrying and the negative coefficient on home ownership 
status (both are highly statistically significant). Hence, we have some evidence for a greater 
relative impact of “ability to pay” as a determinant of lack of access to tap water in urban, 
compared to rural areas. Notably, there is no evidence in either urban or rural areas for 
discrimination in water access against female headed households. 
Whether or not citizens can mobilize effectively for collective action, the cost of 
provision depends on how easily local wells can be dug to access water.
34 National water 
resources data
35 provide estimates of replenishable ground water reserves per capita in different 
states, and in both urban and rural areas this proxy for technical cost of supply has the expected 
negative sign, is stable in empirical magnitude and is highly statistically significant in all 
specifications.
36 
Given the technical cost of water facilities, provision will be more likely where co-
operative action can be more readily organized – this paper attempts to assess the relative 
quantitative importance of social interaction, and of the type of social interaction, compared to 
the structural barriers of caste and class. The novelty in time use data is its direct observation of 
time spent in social interaction, whose impacts can be compared in magnitude to those of 
inequality in land ownership, income and caste status.  
The social capital perspective on local public goods provision implies that a household’s 
probability of having to fetch water will be higher where there is greater economic inequality 
(e.g. in land ownership) and where the percentage of scheduled castes and tribes in the district’s 
population is higher. As Habyarimana et al. (2006, 23) have noted: “From Pakistan to Indonesia 
and from rural Kenya to the United States, a growing literature suggests that the relationship 
between diversity and the underprovision of public goods is not simply an artefact of differences 
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in wealth or patterns of residential mobility. It appears that ethnic diversity has an independent 
(negative) impact on the likelihood that communities can organize collectively to improve their 
welfare.” 
The innovation in the social capital approach is its optimistic perspective that social 
interaction can create networks of mutual trust and thereby facilitate co-operative action, given 
the structural divisions of ethnicity, class and caste. However, when we added together the time 
spent in both community and group activities, we got the results reported in Model B. Contrary 
to the social capital model, time spent on community and group activities is highly statistically 
significant (statistically significant in urban areas) and positively associated with having to fetch 
water – i.e. is negatively associated with local public goods provision. Only when the impacts of 
community work and group activities are examined separately does it become clear that 
associational life within groups has a very different correlation with development in India than 
wider community involvement. In Model C in Table 3, for both rural and urban areas, the 
average time spent by local men in community work (i.e. mostly by other local men) is 
negatively associated with a household’s having to fetch water but the coefficient on time spent 
in group activities is highly statistically significant and positive – a result which we take to 
indicate the possible importance of “bonding” within narrow in-groups defined by occupation, 
caste and class. Apparently, not all forms of associational life are necessarily correlated with 
development.
37 
In the Indian context, caste activities are a form of associational life that is by its nature 
exclusionary.  The ITUS specifically asked respondents about their involvement in caste groups 
(activity code 651). Since politics in India (especially rural India) is strongly influenced by caste 
affiliations, caste also plays a role in participation in political and civic activities (activity code 
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661). While caste based associational life may build strong bonds within the caste-group, the 
counterpart of that within-group solidarity may be schisms and mistrust within the larger 
society.
38 
Our results on the negative impacts of time spent in group activity in India are therefore 
consistent with the many studies
39 that have found that ethno-linguistic fragmentation leads to 
lower or inferior provision of public goods and to lower growth. However, although our results 
using this Indian data can be seen as a cautionary counter-example to the hypothesis that more 
associational life and a more active “civic society” are necessarily and unambiguously a “good 
thing”, we do not mean to imply that “group” activities are inherently divisive. Our argument is 
that such activity is historically and culturally specific in its implications for social capital. We 
note that the associational life which Narayan and  Pritchett (1999a, 1999b) found to be so 
positive in Tanzania was the associational life of a society which developed a unique model of 
rural ujamaa socialism in the late 1960s, which was itself based on earlier traditions of mutual 
help and a lack of local class distinctions in rural areas (Nyerere 1968). Hence, we see no 
contradiction in finding that group activity in a different cultural context, at a different time, has 
a different impact on social capital and development. 
Table 3 indicates that in rural areas both average time spent in social engagements and in 
casual “talking, gossiping, quarrelling” are highly statistically significant, and negatively 
correlated with having to fetch water – but things are different in urban areas. The coefficients on 
casual social interaction and social activities are much smaller than those on community work, 
but all these variables are highly statistically significant and negatively associated with the 
probability that rural Indian households will have to fetch water – which is consistent with 
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Putnam’s perspective on the positive social externalities of social interaction and with the World 
Bank’s recent emphasis on “social capital” in development. 
Table 3 indicates that in both urban and rural areas, the percentage of the local population 
that is scheduled caste or scheduled tribe is generally highly positively correlated with the 
probability a household will have to fetch water. Given that the locality has piped water, there is 
some evidence for individual level discrimination against scheduled tribes (in models B and C in 
rural areas) but no evidence for individual level discrimination against scheduled castes (indeed 
Table 3 shows an anomalous negative association between scheduled caste and fetching water in 
urban areas). Since a decision to allocate priority in water supply infrastructure construction 
between villages can be buried within the bureaucracy while a decision to deny connection rights 
to an existing system within a village is more obvious, it is quite plausible that district 
governments may discriminate between localities, even if village officials face more constraints 
in discriminating between individuals. 
Because land ownership is a meaningful indicator of wealth inequality in rural, but not 
urban areas, this variable appears only in the first three columns of Table 3. A robust result is 
that the percentage of landless households is highly statistically significant and positively 
associated with the chance a given household (landless or not) will have to fetch water.
40 
However, statistical significance does not necessarily imply quantitative importance. 
Furthermore, the marginal impact of each independent variable, considered separately, may 
sometimes be a misleading guide to policy impacts – e.g. land redistribution would affect both 
the percentage of landless households and the inequality of land ownership among the landed. 
Table 4 therefore presents the difference in probability of having to fetch water associated with 
alternative “ceteris paribus” type thought experiments.
41 We compute the probability of fetching 
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water for the same base household that we considered earlier in table 3. To simulate the impact 
of various policies, we recalculate this probability appropriately. 
Table 4 indicates that a thought experiment like “equalizing agricultural land ownership” 
(which would set to zero both inequality in rural land ownership among the landed and the 
percentage landless) might imply a decrease in the probability of having to fetch water of about 
two fifths. If all households were to have the same chance of connection to water supply as 
professional households, the decline in probability of fetching water would be about a sixth in 
rural areas, and about a quarter in urban areas. If the district of residence were to have zero 
members of Scheduled Castes instead of the actual percentage in the median district, the 
proportion of households fetching water might fall by about one seventh in rural areas, and by 
about twice that in urban areas. A 20% increase in the individual household’s monthly 
expenditure levels would have a fairly small impact in rural areas, but a much larger impact (an 
elasticity of about 0.5) in urban areas. However, the difference in probability of fetching water 
associated with homeowner and renter status in urban areas is the single largest observed 
difference in the data. 
Although one can easily think of specific public policies that might affect such variables 
as the percentage of a community that is landless, feasible policies to change social interaction 
patterns are much less obvious. Still, one would like to know if differences in local ‘Social 
Capital’ are associated with ‘large’ or ‘small’ differences in water carrying probability, relative 
to other influences. As a thought experiment, one can imagine that a district with the average 
amount of social interaction time could somehow double that interaction time (which would 
surely count as a ‘large’ change). A doubling of general ‘social activities
42, in both rural and 
urban areas, would only be associated with about a one seventh difference in chances of fetching   25
water. As noted earlier, districts with more community time have less water carrying, but 
districts with more group activity time have more water carrying.  However, a doubling of 
community organized work is only associated with about 7% decrease in water-carrying chances 
while the same proportionate change in group activities has a much stronger opposite effect – an 
increase of 19% (rural) or 12% (urban). In general, the large changes in social interaction 
patterns simulated in Table 4 are associated with impacts substantially less than the impacts of 
caste differentials and those associated with inequality in land ownership in rural areas and home 
ownership in urban areas.  
Since some individual attributes can be thought of as a ‘package’ – e.g. acquiring 
professional status, having a higher income and buying a home – it may also be more realistic to 
examine their joint impacts. In urban areas, these three individual household attributes jointly 
account entirely for the probability of fetching water – but in rural areas they only explain about 
a fifth of the probability, implying that community characteristics retain a dominant role.  Our 
results are therefore consistent with the view that some types of social interaction may help, 
while caste-based group activities may hurt, but it is economic inequalities and caste based social 
divisions that are crucial to the social co-operation which is the basis for local public goods 
supply in India. In urban areas, individual economic advantage, as indicated by income, home 
ownership and professional occupational status, is the key to whether or not a household has to 
collect water, while the inequality of land ownership is crucial in rural areas. 
4. Conclusions 
This paper has used time diary data to measure social interactions and has compared the 
relative empirical importance of ‘social capital’ and of inequality in land ownership and caste in 
determining the probability that an Indian household will have to fetch water. We interpret our   26
results to indicate that although the recent literature on “social capital” has provided important 
insights into the development process, the cleavages of caste and class are fundamental, in the 
Indian context – as the early literature on Indian economic development emphasized. 
Our evidence on gendered inequality in carrying water and documentation of the 
importance of inequalities of caste and class in India may not be surprising. However, we also 
hope to have provided a cautionary counter-example to possibly excessive optimism that the 
growth of “civic society” is necessarily positive for development. Whether “social capital” is 
positive or negative for development – bridging social divides or bonding agents within pre-
existing social groups – is an empirical issue, which depends on the specific historical context. In 
other contexts, time spent in group activities may build trust among individuals across society, 
enabling more effective collective action which improves basic public services, like the delivery 
of water. However, in the specific context of India, our results indicate that it is more likely that 
many group activities reinforce the importance of pre-existing social cleavages (like caste), 
exacerbate the negative impact of inequalities in land ownership, professional status and income 
and undermine the likelihood of community level collective action that might improve  
community well-being – particularly the well-being of poor women –  by relieving people of the 
continuing daily drudgery of fetching water.   27
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Table 1 
Water Collection Time (minutes/normal day) in India – ITUS 1999 
    Rural    Urban    
 










































Age  and  Gender:            
Boys  (6-14  yrs)  1.3%  0.123 48.46 0.4%  0.048 42.19  10  (8.9)% 
Men  (>14  yrs)  7.0%  0.199 39.96  10.9%  0.278 39.80  41.4  (43.2)% 
Girls (6-14 yrs)  4.8%  0.578  50.13  2.0%  0.278  36.03  8.6 (7.8)% 
Women  (>14  yrs)  86.9%  2.102 47.06  86.7%  2.036 43.06 40  (40.2)% 
  100%     100%       100  (100.1)% 
Caste Group:                
Scheduled  Tribe  9.1%  0.114 55.17 4.7%  0.823 58.33 17.7  (4.4)% 
Scheduled  Caste  27.4%  1.020 47.99 8.4%  1.104 38.77 18.1  (9.8)% 
Others  63.6%  0.978 45.08  86.9%  0.999 42.30  64.3  (85.9)% 
  100.1%     100%     100.1  (100.1)% 
Employment  Type  of  HH:            
Professional  5.5%  1.016 50.21  13%  0.903 35.47 5.8  (21.7)% 
Laborer  45.6%  1.056 45.28  34.5%  1.024 45.32  37.6  (19.8)% 
Others  48.8%  0.949 47.57  52.5%  1.018 42.87  56.6  (58.5)% 
  99.9%     100%     100  (100)% 
Land  Ownership  of  HH:            
Landless  55.1%  1.050  45.55      42.6% 
Landed  44.9%  0.942  48.02      57.4% 
  100%        100% 
Homestead  Ownership  HH:            
Owns  58.6%  0.926 48.42  13.2%  0.901 45.14  67.8  (46.2)% 
Does not own  41.4%  1.115  44.32  86.8%  1.016  42.14  32.2 (53.8)% 
  100%     100%     100  (100)% 
Gender  of  head  of  HH:            
Female  11.7%  1.363 42.75 9.2%  1.201 39.98  7.2  (6.7)% 
Male  88.3%  0.963 47.20  90.8%  0.982 42.79  92.8  (93.3)% 
  100%     100%     100  (100)% 
 
Note. - Columns R1-R3, U1-U3 refer to households where some one fetches water on a normal day; R1 
and U1: Total time spent on fetching water on a normal day by individuals belonging to a particular 
category (e.g. boys aged 6-14) as a percentage of the total time spent by all individuals on a normal day 
on fetching water; R2 and U2 = p1/p2 , where p1 - percentage of individuals who belong to a particular 
category who fetch water on a normal day (e.g. boys who fetch water on a normal day as a percentage of 
the number of boys in households in which water is collected on a normal day) and p2 - individuals who 
fetch water on a normal day, expressed as a percentage of the total number of individuals who live in 
households in which water is collected on a normal day; R3 and U3: Average minutes per normal day 
spent in water collection, calculated over those individuals who spend some time on a normal day 
fetching water; POP – population percentages for all respondents aged 6 and above in both water-carrying 
and non water-carrying households.   33
Table 2 
Time Spent (minutes/normal day) on Community, Group, Civic Activities and on Social 
Interaction 
   Rural      Urban   
 Male  Female  All  Male  Female  All 
 
Time on “Talking, Gossiping, Quarrelling”: 
Average Time (over individuals who spend 
positive time) 
Percentage involved 
Average Time (over the total population) 
 
Time on Social Activities: 
Average Time (over individuals who spend 
positive time) 
Percentage involved 
Average Time (over the total population) 
 
Time on Group Activities: 
Average Time (over individuals who spend 
positive time) 
Percentage involved 
Average Time (over the total population) 
 
Time on Community Activities: 
Average Time (over individuals who spend 
positive time) 
Percentage involved 





















































































































































Note. - All average times calculated for adult men and women, i.e. ages 18 or above; Community 
Activities: Activity Codes 611, 621; Group Activities: Activity Codes 631, 641, 651, 661, 671, 681; 
Social Interaction: Activity Codes 811, 812, 813, 814; Talking, Gossiping, Quarrelling: Activity Code 
951 (Time spent outside the house); For descriptions of these activities, see text, notes 20, 21, and 23. 
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Table 3  
Probability that Household Fetches Water  
Marginal Effects
a (p values bracketed) using Bootstrapped Probit
b Analysis  
   Rural    Urban   
Variable Model  A  Model B  Model C  Model A  Model B  Model C 
Monthly per-capita 




























































































































































Percentage of landless 









Inequality in landholdings 
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quarrelling





























































Sample Size  12720  12720 12720 5830  5830 5830   35
Notes. –  
 
a) Marginal effect calculated for a base household: non-scheduled caste, non-scheduled tribe, male 
headed, with average monthly per-capita expenditure and dependency ratio. The household lives in a 
district with average values for all the district-level variables - inequality, scheduled caste proportion, 
scheduled tribe proportion etc. In rural areas, the base case is landless, laborer and homestead owning, 
whereas in urban areas it is not homestead owning and neither laborer nor professional. Marginal effect of 
variable i =  ) ˆ ( ˆ β β b i X f , where  i β ˆ  is the estimated coefficient for variable i, b X  is the vector of 
explanatory variables with values corresponding to the base household, β ˆ  is the vector of estimated 
coefficients (including the intercept) and f is the density function for the standard normal. Interested 
readers can refer to the URL:  
http://economics.dal.ca/Research/Research_Papers_in_Economics/index.php for the estimated 
coefficients, standard errors and computation of marginal effects. 
 
b) For the probit, the dependent variable: =1 if a household fetches water, = 0 if not; Number of 
households that fetch water in rural and urban areas are 2363 (18.58%) and 671 (11.51%), respectively. 
The sample size for the rural (urban) regressions viz., 12720 (5830) is less than the number of rural 
(urban) households in the survey 12750 (5841) because we removed a few outliers and erroneous records. 
For the bootstrap, the number of replications: 1000. We report the p-values in parentheses. 
 
c) The Theil index of inequality (R) can be written as (W+B) where the within component is: 
g g g g R Y n Y n W ) / ( Σ = . Yg – Mean income in village/urban block g, ng – Population of village/urban 
block g,  
Rg – Theil for the village/urban block g, n – Population of the district, Y - Mean income of the district, 
) / ( Y n Y n g g  - Village/Urban block g’s share of the total income in district.  
d) The between component is ) / log( ) / ( ) / 1 ( Y Y Y Y n n B g g g g Σ =  
e) Activity Code 951. Time spent outside the house. Average male time for the district (in minutes/normal 
day) 
f) Activity Codes: 811, 812, 813, 814. Average male time for the district (in minutes/normal day) 
g) Activity Codes: 621, 631, 641, 651, 661, 671, 681. Average male time for the district (in 
minutes/normal day) 
h) Activity Code: 621. Average male time for the district (in minutes/normal day) 
i) Activity Codes: 631, 641, 651, 661, 671, 681. Average male time for the district (in minutes/normal 
day). 
j) Calculated based upon data from the Central Water Commission. 
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Table 4 




Probability that a household fetches water (in the sample) 
 
Increase in probability of fetching water due to: 
 
i) A policy of completely egalitarian land redistribution 
 
 
ii) Change from non-professional to professional status 
 
iii) Increase in monthly per-capita expenditure 
a)  10% increase 
b)  20% increase 
 
iv) Ownership of homestead 
 
v) Change from non-professional to professional status and 
20% increase in expenditure and (in urban areas) homestead 
ownership 
 
vi) Decrease in percentage of Scheduled Caste individuals in 
the district from median to zero 
 
vii) Decrease in percentage of Scheduled Tribe individuals 
from median to zero 
 
viii) Doubling the average time spent on social activities  
 
ix) Doubling average time on community organized work 
 


































































Note. - Absolute and percentage change (bracketed) in the probability of fetching water, where the 
percentage change is calculated on the base case, i.e. = absolute change/0.1858 for rural and = absolute 
change/0.1151 for urban; We compute the probability of fetching water for a base household (non-
scheduled caste, non-scheduled tribe, male headed, with average monthly per-capita expenditure and 
dependency ratio. The household lives in a district with average values for all the district-level variables - 
inequality, scheduled caste proportion, scheduled tribe proportion etc.). In rural areas, the base case is 
landless, laborer and homestead owning, whereas in urban areas it is not homestead owning and neither 
laborer nor professional.  
To simulate the impact of land redistribution in rural areas, we recalculate this probability by setting the 
landless proportion and the Theil among the landed to zero and making the household landed (i.e. not a 
laborer). In simulation (v) we change several variables simultaneously – other simulations are “ceteris 
paribus”.   37
Appendix 
Table A1 
Descriptive Statistics of Some Important Variables 
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Note. - No. of rural (urban) households: 12750 (5841); No. of rural (urban) districts: 51 (52); No. of 
states: 6   38
Figure Legends 
 
Figure 2: Relative Costs of Water Delivery 
 
b1: annualized constant marginal cost per meter of connective piping and maintenance. 
 
OC: Opportunity Cost. 
 
MC: Marginal Cost. 
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1 “Optimum standards in most refugee emergencies call for a minimum per capita allocation of 15 litres per day plus 
communal needs and a spare capacity for new arrivals. When hydro-geological or logistic constraints are difficult to 
address, a per capita allocation of 7 litres per person per day should be regarded as the minimum “survival” 
allocation. This quantity will be raised to 15 litres per day as soon as possible” UNHCR 1992, 5. 
2 In this paper, we use the generic term of water “on tap” to mean water that can be immediately obtained –  most 
often because it is piped into the residence, but also from private courtyard wells or hand pumps in the residence 
(see  McKenzie and Ray (2004), Table1 for a breakdown of the sources of drinking water in India in 1998-99). 
3 In our sample 18.6% (11.5%) of rural (urban) households. 
4 By the criterion of the percentage of the population with sustainable access to an improved water source, the 
UNDP ranks India (at 86%) as far superior to countries like Chad (42%) or Ethiopia (22%) – see HDR (2006, 307-
308). 
5 A fit male weighing 80 Kilograms (i.e. Osberg) can carry 25 litres of water one kilometre in 18 minutes on flat 
sidewalks. Adding 11 minutes to walk the empty journey, and 5 minutes to fill buckets, the total time required for 
one round trip was about 34 minutes. The authors conjecture that 25 litres (weighing 55 pounds, in Imperial units) is 
not far from the maximum practicable weight for a single trip, given the awkwardness of the load. Smaller stature, 
uneven terrain or poorer nutrition – the reality of most people who do this daily – implies that multiple journeys with 
smaller loads would typically be required. A family of four using the UNDP minimum of 20 litres per person per 
day would need eighty litres – which weighs 80 Kilograms (176.4 pounds in Imperial units) and necessarily involves 
several trips. 
6 The personal interview methodology was very labor intensive, but was considered necessary to collect reliable 
diary data from respondents who are, in some cases, illiterate. Gersuny (1998) discusses the advantages of the diary 
methodology, which walks the respondent sequentially through the previous day’s activities, in improving recall and 
imposing aggregate consistency of responses.  An “abnormal” day is defined in the “Instruction Manual for Field 
Staff” (1998, 23) as “that day of the week when guest arrives, any member of the household suddenly falls sick, any 
festival occurs, etc.” The “weekly variant” is “determined according to the pattern of the major earners holiday. If 
the major earner does not holiday, then school children’s holiday will be taken. If even this is not applicable, then 
day of weekly hat (bazaar) may be taken”. 
7 Even in these cases, it is difficult to rule out the possibility that some of this water is used for their own 
consumption. 
8 The gendered inequality of time spent in water collection is common to many countries – see HDR (2006, 87). 
9 In our data,  a large percentage (>80%) of individuals who fetch water are in the states of Haryana and Tamil 
Nadu. These states combined have a small percentage of Scheduled Tribes - STs are largely in Madhya Pradesh and 
Orissa. 
10 Pipe capacity, for example, varies with the pipe’s cross-sectional area (which, if r is the pipe’s radius, is given by 
πr
2 ) while pipe cost typically varies with a pipe’s circumference (which is given by 2π r). 
11 Albeit sometimes, as in the UK, the state may define its role as licensing and regulating privately owned local 
water utility monopolies. For a concise summary of the public/private sector debate in water provision, see HDR 
(2006, 77-107). 
12 If all land were owned by a single landlord, the landlord could operate as a price discriminating water monopolist, 
who could extract from her tenants the entire consumer surplus in water distribution. If land ownership is non-
monopolistic, land owners near the well head can attempt to exploit their market power, but must make irrevocable 
investments to do so. 
13 Recall that the Gini index is defined by 
2 2 / N u u j i μ − ΣΣ , where μ  is the average benefit, which we 
normalize to 1. 
14 On June 30, 2006 a Google Scholar web search restricted to Business, Administration, Finance, and Economics 
returned 56,500 hits on “Water and Social Capital” – by November 7 2007, the number was 87,600. ECONLIT 
searches on these dates generated 3,750 hits on “Social Capital”, increasing to 4,209. “Social Capital” has been 
critiqued alternatively as a ‘confused and ill-specified’ or as a ‘de-politicised, de-contextualising and neo-liberal’ 
concept – Bebbington et al. (2004, 36,40) provide a fascinating guide to the “battlefields of knowledge” within the 
World Bank over the meaning, measurement and possible misuse of the concept of ‘social capital’.  See also Arrow 
(1999), Sobel (2002) and Solow (1999).    42
                                                                                                                                                             
15http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTSOCIALDEVELOPMENT/EXTTSOCIALCAPIT
AL/0,,contentMDK:20642703~menuPK:401023~pagePK:148956~piPK:216618~theSitePK:401015,00.html 
(accessed on January 28, 2008). 
16 This finding conflicted with Knack and Keefer’s (1997, 1251) conclusion that: “Membership in formal groups—
Putnam’s measure of social capital—is not associated with trust or with improved economic performance”. 
17 Social Capital Assessment Tool question 4A1 – Grootaert and Van Bastelaar (2002, 191). For a discussion of 
alternative measurement methodologies, see 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTSOCIALDEVELOPMENT/EXTTSOCIALCAPITA
L/0,,contentMDK:20193059~menuPK:418220~pagePK:148956~piPK:216618~theSitePK:401015,00.html 
(accessed on January 28, 2008) 
18 Narayan and  Pritchett (1999a) note that principal components analysis did not work well in their data, so they 
assume that associational memberships should be weighted by an index of heterogeneity of associational 
membership which is an equally weighted average of a common rescaling of five questions on kin, occupational and 
income heterogeneity, group functioning and membership fees. The implication is that their regression results might 
be somewhat sensitive to alternative scaling or weighting assumptions. 
19 Membership in the American Economics Association does not, for example, guarantee access to professional 
networks in the economics profession – but conference attendance can be a useful input.  ‘Social Capital’ has much 
in common with its older cousin ‘Human Capital.’ In both instances, something intangible (individual skills, social 
norms and networks) is being thought of as a productive stock and labelled ‘Capital’. Both are in practice measured 
by accumulated inputs – e.g. years of education and work experience are used in many labor economics papers as 
measures of  Human Capital, although these are clearly inputs into the productive skills of individuals. As Alatas, 
Pritchett and Wetterberg (2003) discuss, a strict interpretation of the aggregation conditions necessary to measure a 
‘capital’ stock is a demanding criterion. Labor economists finesse the problem of assigning relative values to 
different types of investments in skills by measuring them all in time inputs, and adding up years of input to get 
‘Human Capital’ – perhaps because some may remember the “Cambridge Controversies” on deriving aggregate 
measures of the physical capital stock from market values Cohen and Harcourt (2003). See also Hammer and 
Pritchett (2006). 
20 Community services: 
611. community organised construction and repairs: buildings, roads, dams, wells, ponds etc. and 
621. community organised work: cooking for collective celebrations, etc.  
21 Group activities: 
631. volunteering with for an organisation (which does not involve working directly for individuals) 
641. volunteer work through organisations extended directly to individuals and groups 
651. participation in meetings of local and informal groups/caste, tribes, professional associations, union, fraternal 
and political organisations 
661 involvement in civic and related responsibilities: voting, rallies, attending meetings, panchayat 
671. informal help to other households 
681 community services not elsewhere classified 
22 In the computation of average times, we look at adult men and women, of ages 18 and above.  
23 The social activities that we consider are: 
811: Participating in social events: wedding, funerals, births, and other celebrations 
812. Participating in religious activities: church services, religious ceremonies, practices, kirtans, singing, etc. 
813. Participating in community functions in music, dance etc. 
814. Socializing at home and outside the home. 
24 Recall from endnote 6 that an “abnormal” day is defined as “that day of the week when guest arrives, any festival 
occurs” and is separately coded. 
25 Because community work on water projects (activity code 611) is a particular type of communal time use 
plausibly linked to tap water availability, Table 3 drops this very infrequent activity code from the measure of time 
use in community activities – but this also makes no appreciable difference to our results. 
26 For a succinct description of the functioning of Indian government, see Chaudhuri (2006), which also describes 
the 73
rd and 74
th amendments (discussed below) devolving powers to local rural and urban bodies, respectively. 
27 The district level bureaucracy (especially the collector, who is the administrative head at the district level) plays 
an important role. 
28 In the ITUS data, twelve households were sampled in each village or urban block, implying that we indirectly 
have observations on approximately 1554 local micro communities (1,066 rural and 488 urban). With only twelve   43
                                                                                                                                                             
household observations in each village, sampling variability can be expected to bedevil estimation of characteristics 
of these local communities which are aggregated from household observations at the village level. (Estimation of the 
characteristics of local village society derived from the approximately 50 adult individuals in each village can be 
expected to be more robust.) 
29 Let b, b ˆ , k and N denote the true population value of a coefficient, estimate of the coefficient from a regression, 
the number of bootstrapping iterations, and the number of observations in the original sample, respectively. We 
draw a random sample (with replacement) of N observations from the original sample and estimate the regression. 
We repeat this process k times. Let  *
i b  denote the estimate of the coefficient in the i
th iteration (i=1,…,k). The 
















= . The bias in b ˆ  
can be estimated as  ) ˆ (
*
b b − . Since this bias has an indeterminate amount of random error, it is best to use b ˆ  as 
the point estimate of b (rather than 
*
b , which is the bias subtracted from b ˆ ).   There are three methods that can be 
used to compute  )% 1 ( α −   confidence intervals for b: (i) Normal approximation, (ii) Percentile, and (iii) Bias 
Corrected. In (i) the assumption is that the sampling (and thereby the bootstrapping) distribution is normal. In (ii) the 
confidence interval is constructed based upon percentiles of the bootstrapping distribution. The computations for 
(iii) are more involved and for details, see the references cited, which also present formulae for (i) and (ii). In the 
bootstrapped regressions that we perform (reported in Tables 3 and 4) the biases are small and the above three 
methods yield approximately the same results. Bias estimates and confidence intervals are available upon request. 
30 For the coefficients and standard errors of the probit models reported in Table 3, see 
http://economics.dal.ca/Research/Research_Papers_in_Economics/index.php 
where an Excel file also enables readers to calculate the marginal effects associated with alternative possible 
hypothetical base cases. 
31 Except activity code 611 (community organized construction and repairs) which includes work on ‘roads, dams, 
wells, ponds, etc.’ 
32 We use the terms highly statistically significant, strongly statistically significant and statistically significant to 
refer to statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Unless otherwise stated, we refer to model C. 
33 Other functional forms involving monthly per-capita expenditure - logarithmic, quadratic (with both linear and 
squared terms) and quartic (involving a fourth degree term) are available upon request. Results remained essentially 
the same. 
34 In the simple model of Section 2, we represented this fixed cost as b0. 
35 From the Indian Central Water Commission. 
36 We tried other controls at the state level, e.g. state per-capita GDP and the results were essentially the same. 
37 Alatas, Pritchett, and Wetterberg  (2003) came to a very similar conclusion – that different types of “social” 
activities can have differential effects. The more finely one disaggregates “Group activities” into specific types (e.g. 
661 involvement in civic and related responsibilities: voting, rallies, attending meetings, panchayat), the smaller the 
sample of participants on the surveyed days. Regressions with further disaggregation (e.g. separately identifying 661 
activities) – both using the original data and in 1,000 bootstrapped iterations – reinforce the conclusions above and 
are available from the authors, but are not reported explicitly here due to concern about small sample size. 
38 On this, see Gupta (2001), Saberwal (1986) and Harriss (2002, 38). Some references on caste are Chatterjee 
(1993) and Gupta (1993). 
39 See Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) for a survey. 
40 Using other indices of inequality, e.g. the Coefficient of Variation does not change the results (available upon 
request). 
41 Since each impact evaluated in Table 4 holds “all else constant”, one cannot simply add up individual impacts to 
obtain the joint impact of, for example, becoming both a ‘professional’ and a home owner. 
42 Activities 811 to 814 – see endnote 23 for definition. 
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